Conduct and Character Readings in Moral Theory Divine Command Theory

Meta-ethical theory of morality

Portrait of Saint Augustine, the oldest proponent of the Divine command theory.

Divine command theory (as well known as theological voluntarism)^{[1] [2]} is a meta-ethical theory which proposes that an activity's condition equally morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God. The theory asserts that what is moral is determined past God'due south commands and that for a person to be moral he is to follow God's commands. Followers of both monotheistic and polytheistic religions in ancient and modern times take frequently accepted the importance of God'south commands in establishing morality.

Numerous variants of the theory accept been presented: historically, figures including Saint Augustine, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Søren Kierkegaard accept presented various versions of divine command theory; more recently, Robert Merrihew Adams has proposed a "modified divine command theory" based on the omnibenevolence of God in which morality is linked to homo conceptions of right and wrong. Paul Copan has argued in favour of the theory from a Christian viewpoint, and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski'southward divine motivation theory proposes that God's motivations, rather than commands, are the source of morality.

Semantic challenges to divine command theory have been proposed; the philosopher William Wainwright argued that to be commanded past God and to be morally obligatory exercise not take an identical significant, which he believed would make defining obligation hard. He also contended that, every bit cognition of God is required for morality past divine control theory, atheists and agnostics could not be moral; he saw this as a weakness of the theory. Others have challenged the theory on modal grounds by arguing that, even if God's command and morality correlate in this world, they may not do and so in other possible worlds. In addition, the Euthyphro dilemma, first proposed by Plato (in the context of polytheistic Greek religion), presented a dilemma which threatened either to result in the moral arbitrariness of morality itself, or to result in the irrelevance of God to morality. Divine command theory has as well been criticised for its apparent incompatibility with the omnibenevolence of God, moral autonomy and religious pluralism, although some scholars have attempted to defend the theory from these challenges.

General form [edit]

Philosophers including William of Ockham (c. 1287 – 1347), St Augustine (354-430), Duns Scotus (c. 1265 - 1308), and John Calvin (1509-1564) have presented various forms of divine command theory. The theory generally teaches that moral truth does not be independently of God and that divine commands make up one's mind morality. Stronger versions of the theory assert that God's command is the only reason that a practiced activeness is moral, while weaker variations bandage divine command as a vital component within a greater reason.^[3] The theory asserts that good actions are morally good as a event of divine command, and many religious believers subscribe to some grade of divine control theory.^[4] Because of these premises, adherents believe that moral obligation is obedience to God's commands; what is morally right is what God desires.^[5]

Divine command theory features in the ethics of many contemporary religions - including Judaism, Islam, the Baháʼí Faith, and Christianity - as well equally featuring in numerous polytheistic religions.^[6] In ancient Athens, citizens commonly held that moral truth was tied directly to divine commands, and religious piety was about equivalent to morality.^[vii] Although Christianity does not entail divine control theory, people commonly acquaintance the two. DCT can be a plausible theory to Christians because the traditional conception of God as the creator of the universe parallels the idea that he created moral truths. The theory is supported past the Christian view that God is all-powerful because this implies that God creates moral truths, rather than moral truths existing independently of him, which seems inconsistent with his omnipotence.^[iii]

Augustine [edit]

The 4 Doctors of the Western Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430), Gerard Seghers

Saint Augustine offered a version of divine command theory that began by casting ethics as the pursuit of the supreme good, which delivers human happiness. He argued that to achieve this happiness, humans must love objects that are worthy of human love in the correct manner; this requires humans to beloved God, which so allows them to correctly love that which is worthy of existence loved. Augustine'south ethics proposed that the act of loving God enables humans to properly orient their loves, leading to human happiness and fulfilment.^[5] Augustine supported Plato's view that a well-ordered soul is a desirable consequence of morality. However, unlike Plato, he believed that achieving a well-ordered soul had a college purpose: living in accordance with God's commands. His view of morality was thus heteronomous, equally he believed in deference to a college authority (God), rather than acting autonomously.^[8]

John Duns Scotus [edit]

John Duns Scotus, who proposed a variant of divine command theory

Scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus argued that the simply moral obligations that God could not take abroad from humans involve loving God, as God is, definitionally, the most loveable affair.^[ix] Scotus argued that the natural law, in the strictest sense, contains only what is self-evidently analytically true and that God could non make these statements false. This ways that the commands of natural police force do not depend on God's will, and thus class the start 3 commandments of the Ten Commandments. The concluding seven of the X Commandments do non vest to the natural law in the strictest sense.^[x] Whilst our duties to God are self-evident, true by definition, and unchangeable even by God, our duties to others (plant on the second tablet) were arbitrarily willed past God and are within his power to revoke and replace (although, the third commandment, to honour the Sabbath and continue it holy, has a little of both, every bit we are absolutely obliged to return worship to God, just in that location is no obligation in natural law to practise it on this 24-hour interval or that). Scotus does note, still that the last seven commandments

"are highly consonant with [the natural law], though they do not follow necessarily from outset practical principles that are known in virtue of their terms and are necessarily known by any intellect [that understands their terms. And it is certain that all the precepts of the 2d table belong to the natural constabulary in this 2d way, since their rectitude is highly consonant with first applied principles that are known necessarily".^{[11] [12] [13] [14]}

Scotus justifies this position with the example of a peaceful society, noting that the possession of private belongings is not necessary to have a peaceful society, merely that "those of weak character" would be more easily fabricated peaceful with private property than without. Hence, the concluding seven commandments do belong to the natural police, but not in the strictest sense, equally they belong to the natural law by rectitude rather than by definition.

Thomas Aquinas [edit]

Whilst Aquinas, equally a natural law theorist, is generally seen as belongings that morality is not willed by God,^[15] Kelly James Clark and Anne Poortenga have presented a defence of divine command theory based on Aquinas' moral theory. Aquinas proposed a theory of natural police which asserted that something is moral if it works towards the purpose of human being existence, and and so man nature can make up one's mind what is moral. Clark and Poortenga argued that God created human being nature and thus commanded a sure morality; hence he cannot arbitrarily modify what is correct or incorrect for humans.^[5]

Immanuel Kant [edit]

The deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant has been bandage every bit rejecting divine command theory past several figures, amid whom is ethicist R. 1000. Hare. Kant's view that morality should be determined by the categorical imperative – duty to the moral law, rather than acting for a specific terminate – has been viewed as incompatible with divine command theory. Philosopher and theologian John E. Hare has noted that some philosophers see divine command theory as an example of Kant's heteronomous will – motives also the moral law, which Kant regarded as non-moral.^[16] American philosopher Lewis White Beck takes Kant's argument to be a refutation of the theory that morality depends on divine authority.^[17] John E. Hare challenges this view, arguing that Kantian ethics should be seen as compatible with divine control theory.^[16]

Robert Adams [edit]

Robert Merrihew Adams proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory"

American philosopher Robert Merrihew Adams proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".^[18] Adams presents the basic form of his theory by asserting that two statements are equivalent:

1. It is wrong to do Ten.
2. It is contrary to God's commands to do 10.^[18]

He proposes that God'south commands precede moral truths and must exist explained in terms of moral truths, not the other way around. Adams writes that his theory is an attempt to define what existence ethically 'wrong' consists of and accepts that it is only useful to those within a Judeo-Christian context. In dealing with the criticism that a seemingly immoral act would exist obligatory if God commanded it, he proposes that God does not command cruelty for its own sake. Adams does not propose that information technology would be logically impossible for God to control cruelty, rather that information technology would be unthinkable for him to practice so considering of his nature. Adams emphasises the importance of faith in God, specifically faith in God's goodness, as well every bit his existence.^[19]

Adams proposes that an activity is morally incorrect if and merely if it defies the commands of a loving God. If cruelty was commanded, he would non exist loving; Adams argued that, in this instance, God's commands would not have to be obeyed and also that his theory of ethical wrongness would break down. He proposed that divine command morality assumes that man concepts of right and incorrect are met past God's commands and that the theory can simply exist applied if this is the case.^[20] Adams' theory attempts to counter the claiming that morality might be capricious, equally moral commands are not based solely on the commands of God, but are founded on his omnibenevolence. It attempts to challenge the claim that an external standard of morality prevents God from beingness sovereign by making him the source of morality and his character the moral law.^[5]

Adams proposes that in many Judeo-Christian contexts, the term 'incorrect' is used to mean being contrary to God's commands. In ethical contexts, he believes that 'incorrect' entails an emotional attitude against an action and that these ii uses of wrongness usually correlate.^[21] Adams suggests that a laic'south concept of morality is founded in their religious belief and that correct and wrong are tied to their conventionalities in God; this works because God always commands what believers have to exist right. If God commanded what a laic perceived equally wrong, the believer would not say it is right or wrong to disobey him; rather their concept of morality would break downward.^[22]

Michael Austin writes that an implication of this modified divine command theory is that God cannot control cruelty for its own sake; this could exist argued to be inconsistent with God'southward omnipotence. Thomas Aquinas argued that God'south omnipotence should be understood every bit the power to do all things that are possible: he attempted to refute the idea that God's disability to perform illogical actions challenges his omnipotence. Austin contends that commanding cruelty for its own sake is not casuistic, so is not covered by Aquinas' defense, although Aquinas had argued that sin is the falling short of a perfect activeness and thus not compatible with omnipotence.^[5]

Alternative theories [edit]

Paul Copan argues from a Christian viewpoint that man, made in God'southward image, conforms to God'south sense of morality. The description of actions as right or wrong are therefore relevant to God; a person'southward sense of what is right or incorrect corresponds to God'southward.^[23]

We would not know goodness without God's endowing usa with a moral constitution. Nosotros take rights, dignity, liberty, and responsibleness considering God has designed us this way. In this, we reflect God's moral goodness as His image-bearers.

—Paul Copan, Passionate Confidence: Contemporary Discourses on Christian Apologetics^[23]

As an alternative to divine command theory, Linda Zagzebski has proposed divine motivation theory, which nevertheless fits into a monotheistic framework. Co-ordinate to this theory, goodness is determined by God's motives, rather than by what he commands. Divine motivation theory is similar to virtue ethics considering it considers the grapheme of an agent, and whether they are in accord with God'due south, as the standard for moral value.^[24] Zagzebski argues that things in the world have objective moral properties, such as being lovable, which are given to them through God'due south perception of them. God's attitude towards something is cast as a morally good attitude.^[25] The theory casts God as a practiced example for morality, and humans should imitate his virtues as much as is possible for finite, imperfect beings.^[26]

Objections [edit]

Semantic objections [edit]

Philosopher William Wainwright considered a challenge to the theory on semantic grounds, arguing that "being commanded by God" and "being obligatory" practice not hateful the same thing, contrary to what the theory suggests. He used the example of water non having an identical meaning to H₂O to propose that "being commanded by God" does not have an identical meaning to "being obligatory". This was not an objection to the truth of divine command theory, only Wainwright believed it demonstrated that the theory should not be used to formulate assertions about the meaning of obligation.^[27] Wainwright also noted that divine command theory might imply that one can only have moral noesis if ane has knowledge of God; Edward Wierenga argued that, if this is the case, the theory seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral knowledge.^[28] Hugh Storer Chandler has challenged the theory based on modal ideas of what might be in different worlds. He suggested that, even if one accepts that being commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they may not be synonyms because they might be different in other possible worlds.^[29]

Moral motivation [edit]

Michael Austin has noted that divine command theory could be criticised for prompting people to be moral with impure motivations. He writes of the objection that a moral life should be sought because morality is valued, rather than to avert punishment or receive a reward. This penalisation and reward system of motivation could be seen as inadequate.^[5]

Euthyphro dilemma [edit]

Plato presents the Euthyphro dilemma in one of his dialogues.

The Euthyphro dilemma was proposed in Plato's dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro. In the scene, Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of piety when Socrates presents the dilemma, which can exist presented as the question 'Is X good considering God commands it, or does God control X because it is skillful?'^[five]

Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

—Plato, Euthyphro^[5]

The Euthyphro dilemma can elicit the response that an activeness is good considering God commands the action, or that God commands an activeness because it is skilful. If the get-go is called, it would imply that any God commands must be good: even if he allowable someone to inflict suffering, and so inflicting suffering must be moral. If the latter is called, then morality is no longer dependent on God, defeating the divine command theory. Additionally, if God is field of study to an external law, he is non sovereign or omnipotent, which would challenge the orthodox formulation of God. Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma might claim that divine command theory is evidently wrong because either respond challenges the ability of God to give moral laws.^[5]

William of Ockham responded to the Euthyphro Dilemma by 'biting the bullet'. He argued that, if God did command people to be cruel, then that would be morally obligatory, proposing that the only limitation to what God can brand obligatory is the principle of not-contradiction.^[30] Robert Adams defended Ockham's view, noting that information technology is only a logical possibility that God would control what we consider to be immoral, non an actuality. Even if God could logically command these deportment, he would non because that is not his character.^[v] Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann accept responded to the Euthyphro dilemma past highly-seasoned to the doctrine of divine simplicity, a concept associated with Aquinas and Aristotle which suggests that the substance and attributes of God are identical. They suggest that God and goodness are identical and that this is what makes his commands practiced.^[31]

American philosopher William Alston responded to the Euthyphro dilemma by considering what it means for God to exist morally good. If divine command theory is accepted, it implies that God is good because he obeys his own commands; Alston argued that this is not the case and that God's goodness is distinct from constant by moral obligations. He suggested that a moral obligation implies that in that location is some possibility that the agent may non honour their obligation; Alston argued that this possibility does not exist for God, so his morality must exist distinct from just obeying his ain commands. Alston contended that God is the supreme standard of morality and acts co-ordinate to his character, which is necessarily good. There is no more arbitrariness in this view than accepting another moral standard.^[5]

Omnibenevolence [edit]

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and some more recent philosophers, challenged the theory because it seems to entail that God's goodness consists of his following his ain commands. It is argued that, if divine command theory is accustomed, God's obligations would exist what he allowable himself to do; the concept of God commanding himself is seen as breathless. Neither could God hold any virtues, every bit a virtue would be the disposition to follow his own commands – if he cannot logically control himself, so he cannot logically take whatever virtues. Edward Wierenga counters this by claiming that whatever God chooses to exercise is good, but that his nature means that his deportment would e'er be praiseworthy. William Wainwright argues that, although God does non act considering of his commands, it is withal logical to say that God has reasons for his actions. He proposes that God is motivated by what is morally good and, when he commands what is morally good, it becomes morally obligatory.^[5]

Autonomy [edit]

Michael Austin draws attending to an objection from autonomy, which argues that morality requires an agent to freely choose which principles they live by. This challenges the view of divine command theory that God's will determines what is good because humans are no longer autonomous, merely followers of an imposed moral police, making autonomy incompatible with divine command theory. Robert Adams challenges this criticism, arguing that humans must notwithstanding choose to accept or turn down God'south commands and rely on their independent judgement about whether or not to follow them.^[5]

Pluralism [edit]

Austin considers the view that, in a world of religious pluralism, it is impossible to know which god's or religion'south commands should be followed, especially considering some religions contradict others, leaving it impossible to have all of them. Inside religions there are also various interpretations of what is commanded. Austin notes that some of the responses to the autonomy objection may be relevant, every bit an agent must choose whichever faith and morality they approximate to be right. He argues that divine command theory is also consequent with the view that moral truths tin can be establish in all religions and that moral revelation can exist found apart from religion.^[5] Heimir Geirsson and Margaret Holmgren argue against the view that different religions can lead to the aforementioned God considering some religions are incompatible with each other (monotheistic and polytheistic religions have contrasting views of divinity, for example, and some Greek or Norse gods magnified human weaknesses). They debate that determining which god should exist listened to remains a trouble and that, even within a religion, contrasting views of God exist – the commands of God in the One-time and New Testaments could seem to contradict each other.^[32]

See too [edit]

• Divine judgment
• Ethical subjectivism
• Theocracy
• Fideism

References [edit]

1. ^ Theological Voluntarism — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2. ^ Non to exist confused with medieval theological voluntarism and theological voluntarism every bit an arroyo to natural philosophy.
3. ^ ^{a b} Martin 1993, p. 229
4. ^ Geirsson & Holmgren 2010, p. 37
5. ^ ^{a b c d e f thou h i j thousand l m n} Austin, Michael West. (21 August 2006). "Divine Command Theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved eighteen August 2012.
6. ^ Rae 2009, ch. 2
7. ^ Kowalski 2011, p. 98
8. ^ Connolly et al. 2009, p. 24
9. ^ Swinburne, Richard (2007). Revelation: From Metaphor to Illustration. Oxford University Press. pp. 358–359. ISBN978-0-nineteen-921246-0.
10. ^ Scotus, John Duns (2017). Selected Writings on Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. Ordinatio III, D. 37, "Practice all the precepts of the Decalogue vest to the natural constabulary?". ISBN978-0-nineteen-967341-iv.
11. ^ Scotus, John Duns (2017). Selected Writings on Ethics. Oxford University Printing. pp. Ordinatio 3, D. 37, Q. United nations, para. 25, 26. ISBN978-0-nineteen-967341-four.
12. ^ Williams 2013, Ethics and Moral Psychology: The natural law.
13. ^ Williams 2002, pp. 312–316.
14. ^ Come across Cantankerous 1999, p. 92 for the view that our duties to others "hold automatically [i.e., without God's commands] unless God commands otherwise."
15. ^ "Saint Thomas Aquinas". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2018.
16. ^ ^{a b} Phillips & Tessin 2000, p. 263
17. ^ Phillips & Tessin 2000, p. 264
18. ^ ^{a b} Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 558
19. ^ Pojman & Rea 2008, pp. 558–559
20. ^ Harris 2003, pp. 32–33
21. ^ Pojman & Rea 2008, pp. 561–562
22. ^ Pojman & Rea 2008, p. 559
23. ^ ^{a b} Copan, Paul, and William Lane Craig. Passionate Conviction: Gimmicky Discourses on Christian Apologetics. Nashville, Tennessee: B&H Publishing Group, 2007. p. 91.
24. ^ Baggett & Walls 2011, p. 258
25. ^ Toner, Christopher (ane September 2010). "Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Divine Motivation Theory.(Book review)". The Review of Metaphysics. Archived from the original on 18 May 2013. Retrieved 25 August 2012 – via HighBeam Research.
26. ^ Langermann 2011, p. 54
27. ^ Wainwright 2005, p. 106
28. ^ Wainwright 2005, pp. 106–107
29. ^ Chandler 2007, p. 185
30. ^ Dougherty, Chiliad. V. (2011). Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Idea: From Gratian to Aquinas. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163–164. ISBN978-ane-107-00707-ix.
31. ^ Harris, Harriet (2011). God, Goodness and Philosophy. Ashgate Publishing. p. 101. ISBN978-i-4094-2852-7.
32. ^ Geirsson & Holmgren 2010, pp. 37–38

Bibliography [edit]

• Adams, Robert Merrihew (2002). Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford Academy Press. ISBN0-19-515371-5.
• Baggett, David; Walls, Jerry (2011). Proficient God:The Theistic Foundations of Morality. Oxford Academy Printing. ISBN9780199751808.
• Chandler, Hugh (2007). Platonistic And Disenchanting Theories of Ethics. Peter Lang. ISBN978-0-8204-8858-5.
• Connolly, Peggy; Keller, David; Leever, Martin; White, Becky Cox (2009). Ethics in Action: A Case-Based Approach. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN978-1-40517-098-seven.
• Cross, Richard (1999). Duns Scotus. ISBN978-0195125535.
• Evans, C. Stephen (2004). Kierkegaard'southward Ethic of Honey: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations. Oxford Academy Press. ISBN0-19-927217-4.
• Harris, Michael (2003). Divine Control Ethics: Jewish and Christian Perspectives. Psychology Printing. ISBN978-0-415-29769-i.
• Helm, Paul (1981). Divine Commands and Morality. Oxford Academy Press. ISBN0-nineteen-875049-8.
• Kowalski, Dean (2011). Moral Theory at the Movies: An Introduction to Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-i-44221-455-2.
• Langermann, Tzvi (2011). Monotheism & Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Intersections among Judaism, Christianity and Islam. BRILL. ISBN9789004194298.
• Martin, Michael (1993). The Case Against Christianity . Temple University Press. ISBN978-1-56639-081-1.
• Phillips, D. Z.; Tessin, Timothy (2000). Kant and Kierkegaard on Organized religion. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-31223-234-iv.
• Rae, Scott (2009). Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics. Zondervan. ISBN978-0-31032-323-v.
• Shermer, Michael (2005). Why People Believe Weird Things. Henry Hold & Company. ISBN0-8050-7769-3.
• Morris, Thomas (1988). Divine & Human Action. Cornell University Press. Being and goodness. ISBN0-8014-9517-2.
• Pojman, Louis; Rea, Michael (2008). Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology . Cengage Learning. ISBN978-0-495-09504-0.
• Quinn, Philip (2000). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell Publishers. Divine control theory.
• Swinburne, Richard (1977). The Coherence of Theism. Clarendon Press. ISBN0-xix-824410-X.
• Wainwright, William J. (2005). Religion and morality. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN978-0-7546-1632-0.
• Williams, Thomas (2013). "John Duns Scotus". In Edward North. Zalta (ed.). John Duns Scotus. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 ed.).
• Williams, Thomas, ed. (2002). The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. ISBN978-0521635639.

External links [edit]

• Divine Command Theory — Net Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• God and Morality — a defence of the Divine Command theory.
• Moral Argument and Divine Command Theory — links to relevant on-line resources from Internet Infidels
• Theological Voluntarism — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_command_theory

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